[Meego-security-discussion] Backing up (was: MeeGo Security Goals)

[Yves-Alexis Perez]

On sam., 2011-04-16 at 22:00 +0200, Rene Mayrhofer wrote:
> > 3. Sandboxing of built-in apps to limit damage from exploits.  A lot
> > less clear to me.  What does "limit" mean?  Are app-specific
> > mechanisms (c.f. chromium) acceptable?  Does this devolve into the
> > SELinux "script out permissions sets for every app" model, or is there
> > something more generic?
> App-specific methods do not seem acceptable to me, as most of the apps 
> will not implement them. Make it easy for app developers at the cost of 
> more complexity in the base would be my clear suggestion. 

And that doesn't mean default apps (provided by the vendor) don't have
to use special care for security (chromium seccomp sandbox comes to
mind).

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis
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